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Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
On Mon, 22 Dec 2003, David Blacka wrote:
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04, section 2.3 has the following
> paragraph:
>
> An NSEC record (and its associated RRSIG RRset) MUST NOT be the only
> RRsets at any particular owner name. That is, the signing process
> MUST NOT create (or RRSIG) RRs for owner names nodes which were not
> the owner name of any RRset before the zone was signed.
>
> [There is an editing nit here, too: s/MUST NOT create (or/MUST NOT create
> NSEC (or/, I think.]
>
> I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why
> does this restriction exist? What harm would NSEC records of this sort
> cause?
The current thinking is that empty non-terminals in the non-dnssec realm
become non-empty non-terminals when one starts to associate (dnssec)
records with them. That introduces different meaning from different
perspectives (secure and non-secure) over a single dataset. I'm not happy
with the difference. I don't know the impact of that difference, though
its likely to be small, even benign (but it _is_ a difference).
I'd rather not allow it so we don't have to deal with weird cornercases in
the future.
> It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but
> forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated with
> it.
Allowing such NSEC records should have some useful reason associated with
it, is the way I think.
Roy.
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