Draft Key Rollover History

[Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>]

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Hi,

I have recently been thinking about key-priming for machines that have
been off-line long enough for their trust-anchors to go stale. I've
documented an idea in draft-wijngaards-dnsext-trust-history-00 (
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wijngaards-dnsext-trust-history-00.txt
).

The properties of this solution are:
* The priming keys do not go stale, 10 year old software could install
and re-prime successfully.
* priming keys can be rolled themselves, reducing their exposure.
* priming keys can be revoked if compromised.
* withstand N-1 key compromises.

The zone owner is in control of choices
* Can be lots of keys, packets stay small.
* Number and size of keys can be chosen by zone operator.
  Say using 13 keys for the root zone.
* Number and size of keys can be changed by zone operator with a rollover.
* history is stored at a name of operators choice.
* (ancient) history can be served by a subdomain of the zone, so can be
offloaded to another authoritative server.
* all history data can be treated as unknown RR data types by caches.
* operators can move historical data around.
* operators can discard old private key data and still do all of the
above.

I would appreciate your review and comments.

Best regards,
   Wouter

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