i think i've missed the cutoff for new -00 drafts, but, this is topical and
i'd like to discuss it anyway, even if it can't be on the philly agenda.
Abstract
The small (16-bit) size of the DNS transaction ID has made it a
frequent target for forgery, with the unhappy result of many cache
pollution events throughout Internet history. Even with perfectly
and unpredictably random transaction ID's, random and birthday
attacks are still theoretically feasible. This document describes a
method by which an initiator can improve transaction identity using
the 0x20 bit in DNS labels. The method described here has already
been implemented, and is running in production.
for more, go to <http://sa.vix.com/~vixie/dns-0x20.txt>.
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