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FW: WG Review: Recharter of Handover Keying (hokey)
-----Original Message-----
From: iesg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:iesg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
IESG Secretary
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2009 11:00 PM
To: new-work@ietf.org
Subject: WG Review: Recharter of Handover Keying (hokey)
A modified charter has been submitted for the Handover Keying (hokey)
working group in the Security Area of the IETF. The IESG has not made
any determination as yet. The modified charter is provided below for
informational purposes only. Please send your comments to the IESG
mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by Tuesday, November 3, 2009.
Handover Keying (hokey)
------------------------
Last Modified: 2009-10-19
Chair(s):
Glen Zorn <gwz@net-zen.net>
Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) <tena@huawei.com>
Security Area Director(s):
Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>
Pasi Eronen <pasi.eronen@nokia.com>
Security Area Advisor:
Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>
Mailing Lists:
General Discussion: hokey@ietf.org
To Subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hokey
Archive:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/hokey/current/maillist.html
Description of Working Group:
A mobile device has to re-authenticate each time it changes its point of
attachment to the network. When it goes through the full procedure of
authentication it creates a series of ruptures, during which the medium
cannot flow. This results in a poor user experience during handover.
However, it is possible to shorten the time it takes to re-authenticate
by reusing the key information developed during the initial
authentication.
The Handover Keying Working Group is concerned with developing
procedures for key reuse and delivery, while respecting good security
practice. The Handover Keying Working Group has already done work on
this subject, but it has not yet developed the complete set of
procedures, protocols, and changes needed for different security
environment scenarios and situations.
The solutions specified by the HOKEY WG fall into several categories,
based on timing and mechanism. The authentication and key management may
occur before handoff, when latency is much less critical. Alternatively,
authentication and key management can occur as part of the handoff,
where latency is critical. Solutions should reduce or eliminate the
number of referrals to AAA servers, and solutions should avoid
re-executing lengthy EAP method exchanges. This may be accomplished by
providing new mechanisms for cryptographic keying material in
combination with a protocol for the timely delivery of appropriate keys
to the appropriate entities. Solutions are expected to include "handover
keying," "low-latency re-authentication,"
and "pre-authentication" or "early authentication".
All solution categories are useful, each supporting different scenarios.
The HOKEY WG may provide multiple solutions, each addressing a different
scenario.
Solutions specified by the HOKEY WG must:
1) Be responsive to handover and re-authentication latency performance
objectives within a mobile wireless access network.
2) Fulfill the requirements in RFC 4962 and RFC 5247.
3) Be independent of the access-technology. Any key hierarchy topology
or protocol defined must be independent of EAP lower layers. The
protocols may require additional support from the EAP lower layers that
use it.
4) Accommodate inter-technology heterogeneous handover and roaming.
5) Not require changes to EAP methods. Any extensions defined to EAP
must not cause changes to existing EAP methods.
In specifying an access-technology-independent solution, media
independent guidelines for SDOs may also be needed to explain how the
keying material and signaling can be employed in a specific access
technology.
HOKEY WG Deliverables
=====================
1) A specification of Local Domain Name Discovery for ERP. Currently the
use of DHCP mechanisms to request the local domain name is unspecified.
There are other useful scenarios that need to be addressed. Lower layer
announcement for local domain name is unspecified. Ambiguity with using
initial full EAP exchange for re-authentication needs to be clarified.
Additional re-authentication scenarios, for which there is interest,
need to be addressed.
2) A specification of Early Authentication solutions. These include use
of EAP to pre-establish authenticated keying material on a target
authenticator prior to arrival of the peer.
3) A specification for a Hokey architecture Document. It includes
deployment of ERP and EAP early authentication protocol in the mobile
environment.
There are various useful scenarios that need to be addressed. This
specification and the revision of RFC5296 should be conducted in
parallel.
4) Assistance to the 802.21a group in specifying the integration of EAP
pre-authentication with IEEE 802.21a. The Hokey Working Group shall
perform tasks that are complementary to and do not duplicate work being
done in IEEE 802.21a.
6) A specification for NAS-Authenticator interaction. NAS interaction
can be used to release resources in the old NAS and achieve faster
initiation of authentication. Related work in external SDOs on
authenticator/NAS interaction for re-authentication may be taken into
consideration.
7) A revision of RFC 5296 to eliminate unnecessary references to the
home server.
8) Assistance to the radext and dime Working Groups in developing AAA
support for handoff keying.
Goals and Milestones:
Nov 2009 First draft on Local Domain Name Discovery for ERP Nov 2009
First draft on Early Authentication solutions Mar 2010 First draft on
Hokey architecture Mar 2010 First draft on NAS-Authenticator Interaction
Jul 2010 First draft on revision of RFC 5296 Mar 2011 Submit the Local
Domain Name Discovery for ERP draft to IESG Mar 2011 Submit the Early
Authentication solutions draft to IESG Jul 2011 Submit the
NAS-Authenticator Interaction draft to IESG Nov 2011 Submit the Hokey
architecture draft to IESG Nov 2011 Submit the revision of RFC 5296 to
IESG Mar 2012 Re-charter or shut down WG
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