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RE: Comparison of restoration requirements between transport and packet networks



Hi Neil,

Thanks for your comments.  A couple of comments and
questions in-line.

-Vishal

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ccamp@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-ccamp@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of
> neil.2.harrison@bt.com
> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2003 2:07 AM
> To: rabbat@fla.fujitsu.com; ccamp@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: RE: Comparison of restoration requirements between transport and
> packet networks
>
>
> Hi Richard....please see in-line.  regards, Neil

<snip>

> [Richard] I wholeheartedly agree. 50 ms is most probably not doable in
> shared mesh networks.
> NH=> That was not my point......50ms is *not* required by applications was
> my point.  I see people doing irrational things that have little real
> prectical benefit, and this is not the worst offender.....see my brief
> remarks on 'complexity' in my prior mail, which I have snipped out below.
>
> The general rule with protection/restoration is:
> "As fast as *sensible* (ie don't trigger on error events) as close to the
> duct, and as slow as possible close to the application (and for sure don't
> trigger on error events here......noting that error events can
> get extended
> as they map upwards through layer networks)."

Point well taken. However, I think the original point merely
was that some time bounds (50 ms) may be unrealistic in some situations. But
whatever be the value of time bounds, it would be useful to have some,
so that P&R can be adequately planned. (Of course, that may
require some layering relationships, as you point out below.)

> The other point I was alluding to is that one requires all the defects for
> the mode/technology in question to have been specified in terms of
> entry/exit criteria and consequent actions......and for co modes the FDI
> consequent action is essential for the reaosn I gave previously (snipped
> here).  There are 3, and only 3, networking modes, viz cnls, co-ps and
> co-cs.....all technologies map to one of these.  All modes are
> required, as
> all provide different behaviours.  However, the functional components of
> each mode should migrate to best-of-breed......not crunched
> across all modes
> as that makes zero technical/commercial sense.  OAM and fault
> detection/handling is one key functional component.  It has a different
> specification in the cnls, co-ps and co-cs cases.  It also
> assumes that the
> functional architecture of G.805 (co modes) and G.809 (cnls) is respected.
> In the co-ps/cs case the only valid topologies are p2p and
> p2mp.......break
> the rules here (can't in co-cs mode anyway, can in co-ps mode)
> and you have
> created a difficult (and quite unecessary) OAM/fault-management problem.
> That was was other point wrt to 'can you point to where the defects are
> specified is you want this proposal to be mode/technology agnostic?'

Again, thanks for the thoughts.
I agree that there needs to be some thought given to defect definition,
and some of this will influence the notification actions. However, we'd
like to decouple defect definition from fault notification (which
really begins after a defect (appropriately defined) has been "detected").
Otherwise, the problem is too vast in scope to be handled in one draft.
As Richard pointed out, the focus of the draft is on OTN-related defects.

<snip>
>  [Richard] It may be doable in simpler configurations.  The whole point of
the draft
> is to *guarantee* a notification time.  With all the layers doing
> some kind
> of protection and restoration at different time granularities, escalation
> some layers need to wait for lower layers to recover from a fault/defect
> before starting their own process. How does one define the time
> if there is
> no time guarantee?
> NH=> A laudable aim....but it will never be possible to set hard bounds
> *unless* we fix the hierarchical client/server relationships for
> ever.  Let
> me give you and example for you to answer wrt to the activities
> in the PWE3
> group.  What is the protection speed requirments for SDHoverMPLS in the
> client (SDH) and server (MPLS) case?  And now extend this to some
> arbitrary
> nested client/server stack where one operator may not own the
> layers below a
> certain point (and which he has no visibility of).......so what
> is there to
> control 'which' and 'how many' client/server transitions exist below here?

Perhaps a clarification here. Do you mean that client/server
relationships cannot be fixed for ever (because of structures
like SDHoverMPLS) or do you mean that SDHoverMPLS shouldn't be
defined?

>   Should we assign a random value and hope for the best or should
> there be a
> time after which one is assured that the other layer did not
> accomplish its
> task and engage its own recovery mechanism. Assign 1 second or
> 200 ms or any
> time as being a hard bound, but make it hard.
> The defects that we thought about when we wrote this draft are:
> -       Fiber cut
> -       Transponder failure
> -       Node failure
> I hope this clears up the misunderstanding.
> NH=> See my remarks above.  Wrt to the defects you considered,
> yes I realise you homed in on the OTN.

Great, thanks. So we're in agreement on what the draft is focusing
on.