Access Link Intermediaries Assisting Services (alias) BOF announcement

[Hui-Lan Lu <huilanlu@lucent.com>]

Access Link Intermediaries Assisting Services (alias) BOF

Tuesday, July 15 at 1545-1645
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CHAIRS: Kevin Fall (kfall@eecs.berkeley.edu), Hui-Lan Lu (huilanlu@lucent.com)


AGENDA:

+ Agenda bashing
+ A brief history, Area Directors, 5 min.
+ INTERSEC perspective, T. Woo, 15 min.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-blumenthal-intermediary-transport-00.txt
+ TRIGTRAN perspective, S. Dawkins, 15 min.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dawkins-trigtran-framework-00.txt
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dawkins-trigtran-probstmt-01.txt
+ Tentative charter
+ Wrapping up


MAILING LIST: alias@mailman.berkeley.intel-research.net
TO JOIN: http://mailman.berkeley.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/alias


PROPOSED CHARTER:

Several types of access links in widespread use for Internet connectivity
today have characteristics that affect the operation Internet protocols and
services. Low-bandwidth, high latency links patched over telephone lines via
modems are one common example. Radio links in wireless networks (such as
GSM, IS-95, GPRS and 802.11) are another example. These links often have
undesirable characteristics such as high loss, high delay and low reliability.
Transport intermediaries have been used to enhance the performance of
problematic links in the past (see RFC 3135). This BoF investigates further
work in support of transport intermediaries that provide assistance to
access links, including (but not exclusively) wireless links, primarily in
the areas of security protocol interaction with transport intermediaries and
response to changing link conditions. In particular, existing intermediaries
used for these purposes interfere with IPSec and may weaken overall
end-to-end security - work is therefore necessary to determine how to
request, authenticate and authorize the services of intermediaries, and when
possible to mitigate the interference of intermediaries in security.

This work focuses on support for TCP initially but does not preclude
consideration of other transport-layer protocols. The relationship of
transport intermediaries to devices constrained by OPES and UNSAF is also
critical to the architectural framework.