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Re: I-D ACTION:draft-van-beijnum-multi6-odt-00.txt



On 14-jan-04, at 7:55, Brian E Carpenter wrote:

1. It seems to me that if you ignore the way each of them is described, there is actually a very strong resemblance between ODT and NOID. In effect they both treat the first address used for a session as the ID, and dynamically switch to using alternative addresses as the locator, with a stateful shim concealing the switch from upper layer protocols. Am I confused?

Yes, this part is the same. However, I wouldn't say that


the crude description of ODT is as a degenerate case of NOID.

The shim idea wasn't new in NOID either.


I didn't include address rewriting in routers in ODT because although the idea is very interesting, I don't think the potential gain is big enough to justify all the additional trouble. Also, NOID uses a three-way handshake while ODT uses a model where each end announces information to the other end that may or may not be ignored.

2. One remark that I really don't understand:

8 Tunnel Creation
...
1. Host A announces its addresses to host B

The addresses may be of different address families. Each address is
accompanied by preference information. In order to not unnecessarily
trigger NAT incompatibility, a "current source address" address
family is used to refer to the source address in the IP packet,
which may have been rewritten.

Firstly, we aren't designing for IPv6 NATs, so this would only apply
to the IPv4 case, right?

I hope so. :-)


But in any case, I don't see how it helps. You
can't tell by looking at an address whether it's been rewritten, so
you can't tell if it's OK for checksum purposes.

Which checksum do you mean here?


Iljitsch