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RE: I-D ACTION:draft-coene-multi6-sctp-00.txt
Hi Marcelo,
You were quick. A small preface before I get to your points. I worked
with Lode to get this document done by Friday, it could stand some improvement.
Additionally, the SCTP multihoming document needs updating. We can try to get
these both updated before Seoul.
Secondly, my general feeling is that SCTP is one tool for Multi6 - I am
not sure if it is the entire answer. I think we need to discuss this.
Finally, there have been some interesting ideas on how to transition SCTP
on the ietf.org mailing list, I am not sure if they should/could be discussed in
this document. If so, I can try to capture some of them when we update the document.
Now onto your points:
> Just a couple of comments, IMHO one of the important benefits of using a
> transport layer mechanism to preserve established communications is that the
> security is simpler than the mechanisms at 3.5 layer. The reason for this is
> that only a connection is at stake, and not the complete identity of the
> host.
I agree. One of the interesting properties of SCTP is that it is possible to
for connections to set the addresses to use from the host, for example, over
all/any available interfaces & IP addresses. Applications could use this,
or could include just the IP addresses that they consider important for their
needs.
> This allows to build simple return routability checks which may be
> acceptable, while they are probably not acceptable for lower layer
> solutions. Perhaps a comment about this would fit in section 2.3.2 or in the
> section 3?
This I can include. In a way, SCTP employs a return routable-like mechanism
in the initialization phase.
> Another comment is about how does an sctp solution deals with ingress
> filtering?
In what way do you mean? SCTP has some resistence to DoS-style attacks,
like SYN floody, by way of its setup. This won't solve everything, of couse,
I am sure that hackers will find other ways to cause mischief.
thanks,
John