RE: About the HIP security model (was Re: New multi6 draft: WIMP)

["Ayyasamy, Senthilkumar \(UMKC-Student\)" <saq66@umkc.edu>]

>> the incentive to use such schemes? Although, crypto puzzles work
>> against intruders, are we not penalizing a legitimate user by asking
>> him to waste his CPU cycle?
>
> In other words, you raise the bar for DoS attackers, by slightly 
> penalizing legitimate users.  
  
IMO, HIP is a great choice for mobility/wireless scenarios( otoh, it has
to depend on something else for providing reliability.) But, one cannot 
expect a PDA/mobile device to burn cycles for solving the puzzle. In a 
wired-cum-wireless case, wired nodes are better placed than wireless 
nodes ( wrt CPU cycles.) Also, imagine a scenario where an attacker has
high CPU power and a legitimate user on a low end system. So, I would
expect the puzzle to vary depending on the CPU power (i.e. if high CPU 
power...it should solve fast.) I did see a work by MSR Penny Black folks 
addressing this aspect.
 

>> btw, is their any standardized RFC supporting weak authentication
>> methods?
> 
> My understanding of "weak" authentication is that the whole
> area is pretty new.  In fact, it looks like that we launched
> the term in our paper a couple of years ago:
 
The term is introduced by your paper. But, it is pretty common to see
research works in ad-hoc networks using weak authentication scheme. 
e.g., Ross Anderson's Resurrecting Duckling model. But, i agree, the 
security protocol 2002 survey paper is the widely cited one. I was 
just curious to know about IETF related works using weak authentication. 
thanks to both you and jari for the detailed replies. 
 
I would respond for the remaining parts of the mail after reading the 
HIP arch draft.