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Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-multi6-hba-00.txt
- To: Multi6 <multi6@ops.ietf.org>
- Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-multi6-hba-00.txt
- From: Brian E Carpenter <brc@zurich.ibm.com>
- Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2005 13:44:33 +0100
- In-reply-to: <200412272038.PAA20042@ietf.org>
- Organization: IBM
- References: <200412272038.PAA20042@ietf.org>
- User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.6) Gecko/20040113
Personal comments:
I believe this is also ready to hand over to the future WG.
Just a couple of remarks.
1. You don't discuss the DNS at all - it clearly isn't a requirement
for the HBA mechanism itself to have any DNS entries, but surely
in reality at least one of the addresses will have to go into DNS?
2. A related point - in the discussion in 7.1 of MITM attacks, the
attack you describe only makes sense if the other end has no independent
check of *any* of the addresses in the address set. If even one of
them is (for example) in a trusted AAAA record, a MITM is excluded,
I think.
Brian