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Less is more



On the theory that "less is more", I'm considering dropping a number
of the requirements that are not clearly in the BCP camp.  In the TOC
below (from the -01 doc,
http://www.port111.com/opsec/draft-jones-opsec-01.txt, still waiting
on I-D editor to publish on IETF site), I've marked the ones that will
stay with a "B" (BCP) in first column, and the ones that will go with
an "O" (Other).

Requirements are listed as "O" for one of several reasons: they are not
widespread "current" practices, they are or should be the subject of a
working group/document on their own, they would need a good deal more
definition/work, or it would be difficult to get consensus on them
quickly.

Please have a look and comment.  I can be convinced to move things
between the two groups.

Next week, I will likely split the document into two, with one being
the consensus BCP items, and the other an informational doc giving
ideas for future work.

Thanks,
---George Jones


    2.      Functional Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
    2.1     Device Management Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
B   2.1.1   Support Secure Management Channels . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
B   2.1.2   Support Remote Configuration Backup  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
B   2.1.3   Support Remote Configuration Restore . . . . . . . . . . .  9
B   2.1.4   Support Management Over Slow Links . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B   2.1.5   Support Scripting of Management Functions  . . . . . . . . 10
O   2.1.6   Restrict Management to Local Interfaces  . . . . . . . . . 11
    2.2     In-Band Management Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B   2.2.1   Use Non-Proprietary Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B   2.2.2   Use Strong Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
O   2.2.3   Key Management Must Be Scalable  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
    2.3     Out-of-Band (OoB) Management Requirements  . . . . . . . . 13
B   2.3.1   Support Out-of-Band Management (OoB) Interfaces  . . . . . 13
O   2.3.2   Enforce Separation of Data and Management Channels . . . . 14
O   2.3.3   Separation Not Achieved by Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . 14
O   2.3.4   No Forwarding Between Management and Data Planes . . . . . 15
    2.4     User Interface Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B   2.4.1   Support Human-Readable Configuration File  . . . . . . . . 15
O   2.4.2   Display of 'Sanitized' Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
O   2.4.3   Display All Configuration Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    2.5     IP Stack Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B   2.5.1   Ability to Identify All Listening Services . . . . . . . . 17
B   2.5.2   Ability to Disable Any and All Services  . . . . . . . . . 17
B   2.5.3   Ability to Control Service Bindings for Listening
B           Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B   2.5.4   Ability to Control Service Source Address  . . . . . . . . 18
B   2.5.5   Support Automatic Anti-spoofing for Single-Homed
            Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
O   2.5.6   Ability to Disable Processing of Packets Utilizing IP
O           Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B   2.5.7   Directed Broadcasts Disabled by Default  . . . . . . . . . 20
O   2.5.8   Support Denial-Of-Service (DoS) Tracking . . . . . . . . . 20
O   2.5.9   Traffic Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
O   2.5.10  Traffic Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B   2.6     Rate Limiting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B   2.6.1   Support Rate Limiting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B   2.6.2   Support Rate Limiting Based on State . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B   2.7     Basic Filtering Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B   2.7.1   Ability to Filter Traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B   2.7.2   Ability to Filter Traffic to the Device  . . . . . . . . . 25
B   2.7.3   Ability to Filter Traffic Through the Device . . . . . . . 25
B   2.7.4   Ability to Filter Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B   2.7.5   Ability to Specify Filter Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B   2.7.6   Ability to Log Filter Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
O   2.7.7   Ability to Filter Without Performance Degradation  . . . . 27
    2.8     Packet Filtering Criteria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B   2.8.1   Ability to Filter on Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B   2.8.2   Ability to Filter on Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B   2.8.3   Ability to Filter on Any Protocol Header Fields  . . . . . 28
B   2.8.4   Ability to Filter Inbound and Outbound . . . . . . . . . . 29
O   2.8.5   Ability to Filter on Layer 2 MAC Addresses . . . . . . . . 29
    2.9     Packet Filtering Counter Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . 30
B   2.9.1   Ability to Accurately Count Filter Hits  . . . . . . . . . 30
B   2.9.2   Ability to Display Filter Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B   2.9.3   Ability to Display Filter Counters per Rule  . . . . . . . 31
B   2.9.4   Ability to Display Filter Counters per Filter
            Application  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
B   2.9.5   Ability to Reset Filter Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B   2.9.6   Filter Counters Must Be Accurate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
    2.10    Other Packet Filtering Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B   2.10.1  Filter, Counters, and Filter Log Performance Must Be
B           Usable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B   2.10.2  Ability to Specify Filter Log Granularity  . . . . . . . . 33
    2.11    Event Logging Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
O   2.11.1  Ability to Log All Events That Affect System Integrity . . 34
B   2.11.2  Logging Facility Conforms to Open Standards  . . . . . . . 34
B   2.11.3  Ability to Log to Remote Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
O   2.11.4  Ability to Select Reliable Delivery  . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B   2.11.5  Ability to Log Locally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B   2.11.6  Ability to Maintain Accurate System Time . . . . . . . . . 36
B   2.11.7  Logs Must Be Timestamped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B   2.11.8  Logs Contain Untranslated Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . 37
O   2.11.9  Logs Do Not Contain DNS Names by Default . . . . . . . . . 37
    2.12    Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
            Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B   2.12.1  Authenticate All User Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B   2.12.2  Support Authentication of Individual Users . . . . . . . . 38
B   2.12.3  Support Simultaneous Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B   2.12.4  Ability to Disable All Local Accounts  . . . . . . . . . . 39
B   2.12.5  Support Centralized User Authentication  . . . . . . . . . 39
B   2.12.6  Support Local User Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B   2.12.7  Support Configuration of Order of Authentication
B           Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B   2.12.8  Ability to Authenticate Without Reusable Plaintext
B           Passwords  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B   2.12.9  No Default Static Authentication Tokens (Passwords)  . . . 42
B   2.12.10 Static Authentication Tokens (Passwords) Must Be
B           Configured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
O   2.12.11 Enforce Selection of Strong Local Static
O           Authentication Tokens (Passwords)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
O   2.12.12 Support Device-to-Device Authentication  . . . . . . . . . 43
B   2.12.13 Ability to Define Privilege Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B   2.12.14 Ability to Assign Privilege Levels to Users  . . . . . . . 44
B   2.12.15 Default Privilege Level Must Be Read Only  . . . . . . . . 45
B   2.12.16 Change in Privilege Levels Requires Re-Authentication  . . 45
B   2.12.17 Accounting Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
    2.13    Layer 2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
O   2.13.1  Filtering MPLS LSRs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
O   2.13.2  VLAN Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
O   2.13.3  Layer 2 Denial-of-Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B   2.13.4  Layer 3 Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
    3.      Documentation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
O   3.1     Document Listening Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
O   3.2     Provide a List of All Protocols Implemented  . . . . . . . 49
O   3.3     Provide Documentation for All Protocols Implemented  . . . 50
O   3.4     Catalog of Log Messages Available  . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
    4.      Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
O   4.1     Ability to Withstand Well-Known Attacks and Exploits . . . 51
O   4.2     Vendor Responsiveness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B   4.3     Comply With Relevant IETF RFCs on All Protocols
            Implemented  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B   4.4     Identify Origin of IP Stack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B   4.5     Identify Origin of Operating System  . . . . . . . . . . . 54