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Re: survey of isp security practices



Here are a couple of stabs at reorganization. This isn't a complete re-do but just an idea to show my thinking.

While I'm really, really not trying to do a comprehensive model, I do think it's worth keeping three things in mind:

    1. Risk[1]/Threat:  An impact on the SP if the exploit takes place.
       It is assessed with respect to a revenue source or cost seen by
       upper management, such as bandwidth, network element (e.g., router)
       availability, and host denial of service. By [1], I mean the expected
       financial cost multiplied by the probability of the event.

       I recognize that host denial of service is right at the edge of the
       charter, but I think we need to include things that prevent the host
       being used through the ISP network, such as a SYN-Flood.

    2. Exploit: a class of technical attack

    3. Security mechanisms: a class of measures, including hardware, software
       and procedures/personnel time, to detect and/or mitigate exploits.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Problem Statement

3. Risls/Threats

        3.1 Denial of access to network elements
        3.2 Denial of access to bandwidth
              This can be total or degraded
        3.3 Denial of access to hosted servers
              Again, can be total or degradation

    4. Exploits

    5. Security Mechanisms

5.1 Device Access Security (network element? Application server?)

I'm not completely happy with this heading, as it's closer to a resource under risk than a service. Perhaps the best example in terms of risk is attacking the mechanism by which legitimate users gain access to resources. It could also include theft of service by unauthorized users.


5.1.1 Examples of exploits in the classes below.

               5.1.1.1   Logical access
               5.1.1.2   Console Access
               5.1.1.3   HTTP
               5.1.1.4   SNMP


        5.1.2   Security Mechanisms applicable to the above exploits.
                May also be usable against other exploits.


5.1.3 Security mechanisms

                5.1.3.1  Authenticated access
                5.1.3.2  Encrypted sessions
                5.1.3.3  Usage logging



5.2 Bandwidth

Can include provider infrastructure or customer links

       5.2.1   Examples of exploits

5.2.1.1 IP flooding

5.2.1.2 L2 broadcast storms

      5.3   Routing control plane

      5.4   Routing forwarding plane

      5.5   Host processing (may be out of scope, or be included under
            such things as 5.1 SYN-flood)



-----------------------------------
I haven't characterized the mechanisms under this line as specific to a particular resource. They could appear under several resources. In general, however, the items below need to be categorized into threats and security mechanisms for the resources in jeopardy.
-----------------------------------




   5.  Filtering
     5.1   Threat Description
     5.2   Best Current Practice
       5.2.1   General Inbound Traffic Filters
       5.2.2   General Outbound Traffic Filters
       5.2.3   Device Access Filters
       5.2.4   Route Filters
       5.2.5   MAC Address Filters
       5.2.6   DoS Mitigation Filtering
       5.2.7   SinkHole / Blackhole
       5.2.8   uRPF
   6.  Logging (accounting)
     6.1   Threat Description
     6.2   Best Current Practice
       6.2.1   What traffic is logged
       6.2.2   What fields are logged
       6.2.3   How long are logs kept
       6.2.4   Local buffer vs syslog (for backup info)
       6.2.5   Authentication from peer to peer of log files?
       6.2.6   Integrity check of log files?
       6.2.7   NTP source considerations
   7.  Device Integrity
     7.1   Threat Description
     7.2   Best Current Practice
       7.2.1   Device Image Upgrade
       7.2.2   Device Configuration
       7.2.3   Management/Logging Information
   8.  Specific Protocol/Service Concerns
     8.1   Threat Description
     8.2   Best Current Practice
       8.2.1   ICMP
       8.2.2   Generally Unused Services
   9.  Policy/Procedural Considerations
     9.1   Threat Description
     9.2   Best Current Practice
       9.2.1   Equipment Software Update
       9.2.2   Equipment Configuration Change


--
Howard C. Berkowitz
5012 25th Street South
Arlington VA 22206

(703)998-5819 voice
(703)998-5058  fax (alas, sometimes poorly operated by "helpful" cat)