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RE: Capabilities negotiation problem statement
> 3GPP2 for example use advertisement for:
> Prepaid - Before we push down a Prepaid policy we need to know whether
> the NAS supports that policy. Otherwise the NAS will ignore the policy
> and allow the session to continue. As you can see this is a serious
> problem.
This case sounds the same as the security issue with filter rules. That
is, the RADIUS server needs to send an attribute that cannot be safely
ignored by the NAS.
> Dynamic Auth - we need to understand whether a NAS supports 3576 for
> correct operation.
RFC 3576 already specifies how a RADIUS server can determine if a
NAS supports it. Where the RADIUS client does not support RFC 3576, the
server will receive an ICMP port unreachable message in reply to a
Disconnect or CoA-Request. If the proxy supports RFC 3576, but the NAS
does not, then the proxy replies with an Error-Cause value of "Unsupported
Extension":
"Unsupported Extension" is a fatal error sent due to lack of support
for an extension such as Disconnect and/or CoA messages. This will
typically be sent by a proxy receiving an ICMP port unreachable
message after attempting to forward a Request to the NAS.
> Sure for simple deployement scenarios like Dial up. But now we are
> talking about more sophisticated usage for RADIUS.
The existing RADIUS mechanisms work for all services. They are not just
for "dialup".
> But this is not efficient. Why send an attribute or a set of attributes
> if they are not required by the Server?
RADIUS is a request/response protocol. There is no way for a NAS to know
what the RADIUS server requires before sending an Access-Request.
> For one I need to be assured that the NAS supports the mandatory
> semantics.
That's relatively simple though -- a NAS can signal support for the
extended format with a single attribute.
> I may support NAS Filter Rule but only some of its options.
To date, RADIUS documents have focused on a single subject and included
clear guidelines about what is needed to be considered compliant. As an
example, RFC 2868 is focused on tunnel attributes, so that a vendor can
indicate that they are compliant with it, without being forced to
implement attributes relating to a different capability.
Similarly, existing RADIUS attributes are typically either implemented or
not implemented. If an attribute covers divergent capabilities so that
vendors are unlikely to fully implement it within a single device, I would
argue that that attribute should be broken down into distinct attributes,
each with a unitary purpose.
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