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RE: Capabilities (was Re: AW: Review of draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-04.txt )
BTW this trust issue is also an issue with Diameter
Both are hop-by-hop secure so have the same issues. Although Diameter
has a redirection capability as a work around - which will be
interesting to see if it ever gets deployed in high transaction
environments.
Even using EAP. Although the authentication is End-to-End the result of
the authenticaiton, typically a key is sent back to the NAS through
proxies. The proxies see the Key.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-radiusext@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-radiusext@ops.ietf.org] On Behalf Of Emile van Bergen
> Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 2:48 PM
> To: Bernard Aboba
> Cc: Nelson, David; radiusext@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Capabilities (was Re: AW: Review of
> draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-04.txt )
>
> Hi,
>
> On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 12:22:51PM -0700, Bernard Aboba wrote:
>
> > > > The RADIUS server may REQUIRE location in order to evaluate a
> > > > authentication/authorization policy. That policy could
> state that
> > > > if location is not provided then allow the user on with certain
> > > > constraints.
> >
> > Yes, but the RADIUS server can do this *after* it has
> indicated that
> > it requires the NAS to provide location information via an
> Access-Challenge.
> >
> > For example, the NAS initially does not send location
> information; the
> > RADIUS server sends an Access-Challenge asking for it; the
> NAS still
> > does not send it, and then the RADIUS server sends an Access-Accept
> > with limited authorizations, instead of an Access-Reject.
> >
> > In this scenario, there is still no need for "capabilities
> advertisement"
> > by a NAS.
> >
> > > In the case of location information, what is the problem with the
> > > NAS always providing any location information that it has to the
> > > RADIUS server?
> >
> > It may be undesirable for the NAS to send location by
> default. But as
> > argued earlier, this is not a problem -- the RADIUS server
> can ask for
> > the information.
> >
> > > If the issue is that the User wants the NAS to only disclose
> > > location to RADIUS servers that he trusts, I think there
> is a lot of
> > > heavy lifting to do.
> >
> > I'd argue that the only RADIUS server that a user can trust is its
> > home RADIUS server. There can be no notion of a user trusting
> > intermediate proxies.
>
> If I ever understood RADIUS, trust has always been entirely
> hop-by-hop.
> The user connects at the NAS and trusts it to make a
> decision. The NAS sends a RADIUS request to a server it
> trusts to give it an accept or reject. That server in turn
> may query a database it trusts, or another RADIUS server that
> it trusts.
>
> Hiding credentials from proxies (by using a
> challenge-response protocol or an encrypted tunnel such as
> TTLS) is an orthogonal matter.
>
> If a local NAS or AAA doesn't want to trust his upstream
> AAA's, then the choice of authentication protocol would needs
> /very/ careful attention, to say the least. That there can be
> no notion of trusting your proxies, rules out every
> authentication protocol in current existence other than
> EAP-TTLSv1 or EAP-PEAPv2, if I see it correctly, both of
> which are in draft stage and hardly implemented yet.
>
> There's a fundamental issue: how can you ever sensibly ask
> someone you don't trust, whether or not to provide service to
> a user you don't know?
>
> I'd say, never query a proxy you don't trust, /unless/ you're
> using an EAP method that provides server authentication,
> message integrity, confidentiality, cryptographic binding,
> you only rely on the accept/reject messages inside the
> tunnel, and you've /thorougly/ verified your assumptions.
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Emile.
>
> --
> E-Advies - Emile van Bergen emile@e-advies.nl
> tel. +31 (0)78 6136282 http://www.e-advies.nl
>
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