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Re: draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-06



As far as I know version -06 is not available yet. The latest available version is -05, where the issue is still present.

Once we have seen version -06 or a preliminary version I can comment.

/Miguel

Nelson, David wrote:
Does this resolve RADEXT Issue 138?


The latest version of the draft does no longer contain a link between
sips/https and
RADIUS. However, the Security Considerations section names refusing
sips/https request as one non-normative option to avoid the security
level mismatch of sips/https and unencrypted RADIUS:

"To prevent RADIUS from representing the weak link, a RADIUS
client receiving an HTTP-style request via TLS or IPsec could use an
equally secure connection to the RADIUS server.  There are several
ways to achieve this, for example:
  o  the RADIUS client may reject HTTP-style requests received over

TLS

     or IPsec
  o  the RADIUS client require that traffic be sent and received over
     IPsec.
RADIUS over IPsec, if used, MUST conform to the requirements
described in [RFC3579] section 4.2."



--
Miguel A. Garcia           tel:+358-50-4804586
sip:miguel.an.garcia@openlaboratory.net
Nokia Research Center      Helsinki, Finland


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