Re: Follow up on Authorize Only issue (was RE: [Isms] ISMS session summary)

["Alan DeKok" <aland@nitros9.org>]

"Glen Zorn \(gwz\)" <gwz@cisco.com> wrote:
> OK, yeah, but I didn't say anything about guesses: in that scenario, the
> compromised NAS has saved valid credentials from previous =
> authentications & used them for nefarious purposes.

  It could also save authorization parameters, for precisely the same
reason.

> I hope that the issue is not divulging the contents of RADIUS attributes
> but something a bit more serious, like authorizing an imposter.

  A compromised NAS can authorize anyone it chooses for any purpose.

  If the threat we're trying to avoid is a compromised NAS, then there
is little point in doing more security analysis.  The NAS is *inside*
of the RADIUS trust boundary, with all of the side-effects that result.

  If the threat we're trying to avoid is someone fooling a trusted NAS
into leaking information about users, then that situation is somewhat
more managable.

  Alan DeKok.

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