I'm a bit biased to answer this, but..
On Sun, 4 May 2003, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> I'm wondering what we should do with this draft.
I've been wondering about the same too, due to lack of feedback since the
last revision from the WG. I must assume it's perfect ;-)
> It seems to me to be basically correct (i.e. it says that
> there are specific spoofing and DoS attacks using 6to4 that
> are harder to trace than "standard" spoofing and DoS attacks).
>
> It is more explicit about the checks to be applied than the base
> 6to4 specification, but those checks cannot eliminate the attacks.
True enough, they should make it easier to implement 6to4 properly. This
is also possibly something that could form a basis on what to ask from the
security side if we progress 6to4 to Draft Standard one day.
> The document might also assist intrusion-detection implementors
> in detecting these attacks.
>
> So I think it should probably be published as an Info RFC, and
> if/when we revise the basic 6to4 spec, Pekka's document would
> be a source for improving the security section.
Pretty much agree, informational seems to be the best way here.
If we need to fork off separate efforts to modify 6to4 spec or augment
that, it should be in separate, short documents referencing this.
In short, it seems to me that we can't find a proper solution that would
satisfy everyone at the moment (and we may not even need one really
badly), so it might make more sense to just push the documentation of the
issues out and leave specific solutions for later.
Easier to get consensus on this than a specific solution, I think.
--
Pekka Savola "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings