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Re: New I-D: Teredo Security Concerns Beyond What Is In RFC 4380



On Jun 4, 2007, at 09:51, Templin, Fred L wrote:
From: JORDI PALET MARTINEZ [mailto:jordi.palet@consulintel.es]
From Rémi Denis-Courmont <rdenis@simphalempin.com>
Le vendredi 1 juin 2007, james woodyatt a écrit:
I think the worry here is about the Teredo implementations that  
might be integrated into malware for the purpose of escaping  
network perimeter policy enforcement.  In particular, I'd think  
that enterprises interested in controlling Skype would be  
concerned that Teredo might present an otherwise uncontrolled   
communication vector.
I respectfully disagree. [...] You are blaming Teredo instead of  
the poorly managed network here.
Fully agree.  It is a matter of properly managing a "managed  
network".
I agree with this too, [...]
I should have mentioned that I didn't think security was a  
particularly important concern here.  As an implementor of security  
capabilities, my objectives are to stay current with best current  
practice.  My impression is that "best" remains an open topic of  
discussion.  I'm getting buffeted from both sides on this topic, and  
I don't want to hold myself out as an expert on security mechanisms.
My main concern with Teredo is trying to keep it from being anything  
more than transition mechanism.  To that end, I'm very sensitive to  
any cases where security perimeter enforcement makes the utility of  
Teredo higher from the perspective of an end user than the use of  
native IPv6, where both are available.  If Teredo is a method for  
bypassing security policies at firewalls, then Teredo becomes more  
than merely a transition mechanism.  No?

--
james woodyatt <jhw@apple.com>
member of technical staff, communications engineering