Re: draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps-01.txt and draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-02.txt WGLC

[Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>]

I think this is useful work. I have no substantive comments
on draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps. I have a couple of
concerns with draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-02:

> 2.8.  Next-hop Selection
>
>    The mechanism can control next-hop-selection behavior at hosts or
>    cooperate with other routing mechanisms, such as routing protocols
>    and RFC 4191 [RFC4191].  If the address-selection mechanism is used
>    with a routing mechanism, the two mechanisms has to be able to work
>    synchronousely.

Do we really want to mix these two issues? Wouldn't a better design
be to say that RFC 4191 *is* the solution to control next-hop selection
and choice of source address? Then the constraint here is only to allow
simultaneous usage with 4191.

> 3.  Security Considerations
>
>    Incorrect address-selection can lead to serious security problems,
>    such as session hijack.  However, we should note that address-
>    selection is ultimately decided by nodes and their users.  There are
>    no means to enforce a specific address-selection behavior upon every
>    end-host from outside of the host.  Therefore, a network
>    administrator has to take countermeasures for unexpected address
>    selection.

As a threat analysis, this seems a bit weak. Should we say after the
first sentence that this threat requires address-selection messages
to be authenticated?

What does the last sentence mean? Does it mean that ingress
filtering needs to be implemented at the first-hop router?

    Brian