[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: R41 in draft-ietf-v6ops-cpe-simple-security-07




On Jul 29, 2009, at 1:22 AM, james woodyatt wrote:

On Jul 28, 2009, at 20:36, Rémi Denis-Courmont wrote:

That said, not to put the full blame of UPnP. Manual HTTP configuration interfaces with default passwords are also prone to abuse - regardless of UPnP. And really, I don't see any credible alternatives for vendors to use.

I very much doubt that we need to worry overly much that UPnP IGD will ever have a protocol specification that complies with RFC 3979, RFC 4879 and RFC 5378.

Therefore, the purpose of R41 can easily be inferred as being a circumlocution to say: don't use UPnP IGD. Vendors may choose to ignore recommendation R41 and deploy UPnP IGD anyway, but we won't be complicit if they do.


When I first read R41 months ago, I did not read it as a requirement intended to be an IGD killer. The motivation for R41 should be based on reasons that are independent of IGD or any corporate interests; they should have to do with what technology is needed and why the IETF should provide it. Also, the motivation for removing R41 should not be based on whether it will help or hurt the chances of getting the document published. If the group can clearly articulate why this technology is needed and why the IETF is the organization to provide it, then I'd say we have an obligation to bring it to the IESG. I'm sorry I missed the meeting and wonder if some positive motivation has been given for R41 rather than problems with other protocols, IGD and IPsec, or issues with the IPR policies of another SDO.

Mark




As long as the current treatment of IPsec AH, ESP and IKE remains in the draft as is, I have no objection as an individual contributor to removing recommendation R41. It was originally inserted when the draft had a much more restrictive treatment of IPsec AH, ESP and IKE that would have rendered IPsec transport mode basically useless for most applications aimed at communicating with hosts in residential networks. I even wrote draft-woodyatt-ald as a proposal for meeting recommendation R41 with a new protocol. Once the treatment of IPsec and IKE changed in the IPv6 CPE Simple Security draft, I shelved all my work on ALD.


--
james woodyatt <jhw@apple.com>
member of technical staff, communications engineering