On Sat, 22 Aug 2009 22:33:37 -0700
james woodyatt <jhw@apple.com> wrote:
On Aug 22, 2009, at 21:58, Truman Boyes wrote:
This is quite confusing from an implementation perspective; security
is not explicitly increased by prohibiting non-encrypted tunnels but
allowing encrypted (ESP or AH) traffic flows. Wouldn't this simply
serve as a driver to make all tunnel encapsulations use ESP/AH?
Yes. I'm not sure I can explain how this is supposed to increase
security, but if consensus in the working group emerges around these
recommendations and the draft can proceed through working group last
call, then that's good enough for me.
Maybe I haven't fully understood the question, however isn't the
answer
as simple as the benefits of IPsec over cleartext? Even the
better-than-nothing-mode of IPsec, while vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks during session setup, has a much smaller
window of opportunity for exploitation over clear text traffic.
Regards,
Mark.