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Re: U.S. Homeland Security dept, ICANN, and the root servers



fwiw, what I have been told is that no change to the root zone is ever done without the change request having been signed by a PGP key that is held by the US DoC; they, in turn, don't sign off on anything unless it arrives there signed with an ICANN-held PGP key.

And it's been that way (or equivalents thereof) every single day since Jon Postel stopped being solely responsible.

My understanding.

And no, I don't think the IAB-as-IAB needs to wade into this swamp; this is most definitely a political issue - the technical issue is that there needs to be one authoritative root zone file, and that everyone needs to be clear about which one that is, and they *are* doing that.

Harald

--On onsdag, april 02, 2003 16:31:27 -0800 Sally Floyd <floyd@icir.org> wrote:

I have a problem in principle with all root-zone changes needing to be
approved by the US Department of Commerce.
Yep, me too.

(Does the U.S. government really plan to try to take back parts of
a role that it has long given up, of responsibility for the global
Internet infrastructure?  It would be distressing if the IAB ended
up with no choice but to wade more deeply into the non-IETF-IANA
portion of the ICANN morass...)

- Sally