draft-ietf-msdp-spec-16.txt vs. security

[Steve Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>]

What shall we do about draft-ietf-msdp-spec's security considerations?  
I'd like to make Keyed MD5 a MUST; Alex says that many implementations 
don't have even that.  If it were standards track, there'd be no 
question -- we block the I-D until they get it right.  This is 
Experimental.  Do we require a MUST, even though that's not real?  
(Does MUST mean anything for Experimental?)

I think that the question partly turns on the community's intentions 
for MSDP.  Are we trying to build on it?  If so, require MUST.  Is this 
just documenting an evolutionary dead end?  If so, get rid of the MUSTs 
from the security considerations, and in fact rewrite to to say "some 
implemtations use 2385, some don't; here are the evil things that can 
happen if there's inadequate authentication and/or confidentiality, and 
here are the authorization requirements".  (That would be good to say 
in any event.)

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)