Re: IETF 57 Multu6 WG - Monday morning session - minutes

[Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>]

Geoff;

> Matsataka Ohta: IPv6 has large timeouts for various purposes. If your 

< Matsataka Ohta: MIPv6 has large timeouts for various purposes. If your 

> address selection. When should a host attempt alternate addresses? Proposed 
> in response to ICMP, routing change, timeouts (TCP only). Proposed that 

> address selection. When should a host attempt alternate addresses? Proposed 
< in response to ICMP, routing change, timeouts (TCP, but not IP nor UDP, has a defact default). Proposed that 

> Pekka Nikkander: You did not mention security issues in your presentation - 
> is this to be addressed later on, or do you have comments now?
> Matasaka Ohta: The current Internet is weakly secure. Cookie-based security 
> for locator change give only the same level of security.

> Pekka Nikkander: You did not mention security issues in your presentation - 
> is this to be addressed later on, or do you have comments now?
> Matasaka Ohta: The current Internet is weakly secure. Cookie-based security 
< for locator change give JUST the same level of security.

It's overkill to use DSA signature only to confirm that
random peers keep identities.


> - - draft-ohta-multihomed-isps-00.txt, Masataka Ohta, 10 min
> 
>    All hosts should have full default-free routing table. This allows 
> selector in host to make optimal locator choice, and know when locator is 
> unreachable. source address selection for ingress filtering only. The peer 
> will not use the source address - it will make its own selection of a 
> locator for the peer. Extended example of policy control and filtering.

> locator for the peer. Extended example of policy control and filtering.
< NLAs may have as many peers as necessary and have full control on
< egress policy, though there is small limitation on ingress policy
< control, ingress control is limited from the beginning and is
< not a problem.

							Masataka Ohta