Re: security requirement for multi6

[Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>]

Iljitsch;

I should state an elementary fact again.

DoS is so easy.

That is, that you happen to find a way of DoS does not mean other
forms of DoS is not possible.

> > Prevention of connection hijack against a temporary MITM
> > is not a requirement, at all.

> The attack vector here would that an attacker opens a TCP session to a 
> third party relay host and requests a large amount of data. When the 
> data starts flowing, the attacker sends a false rehoming message that 
> makes the relay host redirect the flow to the target. Then the attacker 
> sends spoofed TCP ACKs that make the relay host keep sending data at 
> high speed.

The attacker as a temporary MITM opens a TCP session to a third party
relay host with a spoofed source address of a target and requests a
large amount of data. When the data starts flowing, the attacker
moves away that makes the relay host direct the flow to the target.
Then the attacker, now at a distance, sends spoofed TCP ACKs that
make the relay host keep sending data at high speed.

							Masataka Ohta