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Re: identifiers and security

I think if the redirection problem by attackers that are on-path
temporarily is limited to individual unprotected sessions, we are not
materially worse off than today as the same attacker could break the
sessions today also, and redirecting an unprotected session presumably
isn't worse than breaking it as the contents aren't secret.


I think there is a difference between
 - someone breaking into to office looking at the pieces of paper on
   my desk
 - someone breaking into my office and installing a device which allows
   them to look at all future pieces of paper I will place on my desk

Thus there is a difference between looking at unprotected communication
while being on the path, and looking at unprotected communication
long after having left the path.
But this might be a case where we can make things be slightly worse than
in today's Internet since this communication was unprotected in any case.


I am not sure how slightly this is...

suppose a host A with Locator LA
A server B with locator LB
and an attacker X with locator LX

A usually connects to B to get some information, for instance the news.

Now, X manages to be on the path between A and B for a while.
Now, X starts a communication with A and pretends to be B, and X creates a state in A mapping the identifier of A with locator LX.
Note that it can do that because the verification will be based on the RR and X will succeed because he is on the path.
Then, X leaves the place and goes to somewhere more comfortable for him

Now, in the future when A tries to reach B he will contacting X... forever ;-)

I don't feel that this would be acceptable

Regards, marcelo


Erik