Re: identifiers and security

[Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@sun.com>]

> I am not sure how slightly this is...
> 
> suppose a host A with Locator LA
> A server B with locator LB
> and an attacker X with locator LX
> 
> A usually connects to B to get some information, for instance the news.
> 
> Now, X manages to be on the path between A and B for a while.
> Now, X starts a communication with A and pretends to be B, and X 
> creates a state in A mapping the identifier of A with locator LX.
> Note that it can do that because the verification will be based on the 
> RR and X will succeed because he is on the path.
> Then, X leaves the place and goes to somewhere more comfortable for him
> 
> Now, in the future when A tries to reach B he will contacting X... 
> forever ;-)
> 
> I don't feel that this would be acceptable

I agree at some level, because this was the conservative approach that
was taken in the MIPv6 security design.

But one can argue against that by:
 - if the attacker was on the path, why couldn't the attacker leave a small
   device (running on a battery for a month for instance) attached?

  Erik