RE: RADEXT WG re-charter

["David B. Nelson" <dnelson@elbrysnetworks.com>]

Bernard Aboba writes...

> At IETF 71, the technical discussion brought up the following points:
> 
> a.  The integrity protection for keywrap is considerably *weaker* 
> (e.g. 64 bits) than for standard MIC algorithms.
> b.  Encryption algorithms for keywrap cannot be securely used to do
> bulk encryption of data, but algorithms that can do bulk encryption
> can securely be used to encrypt keys.

Are there specific recommendations (e.g. an "SP" series document) from NIST
that cover the use of bulk encryption algorithms to encrypt keys?

> c. Existing IETF standards (such as Diameter EAP, RFC 4702) use TLS to
> protect keys.

> Given this, I would suggest that assertions made about NIST positions
> should be ruled out of scope, unless they come directly from
> representatives of NIST.

Or presumably from existing NIST publications...

I tend to think (individual opinion) that facilitating FIPS "certifiable"
implementations might be a reasonable requirement to be added into the
RADIUS Crypto-Agility Requirements draft, assuming the reference is to an
existing NIST publication.  I understand that these publications would
discuss algorithms and modes only, and not cover how to encapsulate a key in
a RADIUS attribute.



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