Re: [RRG] arguments for map and encap

[Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>]

On 2008-05-23 18:48, Christian Vogt wrote:
> 
> On May 22, 2008, at 21:48, Tony Li wrote:
> 
>>> Except for traceability, fault isolation, etc., not to mention
>>> latency of state-reestablishment after a crash in the absence
>>> of an explicit control plane state establishment protocol, etc.
>>>
>>
>> Wouldn't those issues be reasonably address if the mapping was
>> stable enough to be cached in stable storage?
> 
> Or if the mapping was stateless, i.e., 1-to-1?
> 
> Traceability, fault isolation, etc., would also be mitigated by
> 1-to-1 mapping.  Especially in IPv6, where the mapping could be as
> simple as a prefix exchange.

Don't forget that the address is today also an essential part of
the data for a cryptographic protection of an end to end session.
In that role it could of course be replaced by some ID inserted
at a level above IP (as it is in IPSEC over UDP, in effect), but we
have to provide that at the same time as architecturally removing
e2e addressing. And if you do that *except* by inserting an alternative
32 or 128 bit e2e quantity that looks just like an IP address, you create
unthinkable amounts of disturbance to upper layer running code.

   Brian

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