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Re: Multiple security mechanisms



Hi Iljitsch,
El 09/08/2006, a las 14:11, Iljitsch van Beijnum escribió:

[BTW: I'm reposting three messages from last week that I don't think made it to the list.]
How about the following to move forward in the dicussion on HBA/CGA 
patent issues and the need/want for other security mechanisms:
I still have to do a full review of the shim6 proto spec, but the way 
I understand it, today, the security mechanism (HBA) is either an 
integral part of the signalling, or it's encapsulated into the shim6 
signalling protocol.
What if we make this the other way around? So we isolate the shim6 
signalling from the security and then allow multiple security 
mechanisms to encapsulate the signalling and send it over the wire 
using appropriate mechanisms. For the current stuff this would look 
like this:
[shim header][shim signalling][HBA/CGA]

or

[shim header][HBA/CGA][shim signalling]

The changes, if needed, should be minimal: just move the HBA/CGA stuff and the shim6 signalling to opposite ends of the packet so they can be easily separated.
i think it would be possible to achieve something similar to what you 
are after with the current spec
The current spec defines the Locator List Option Format where the 
alternative locators are carried.
Fro each of  the locators contained in the list, there is a field 
called  Verification Method that states which is the verification 
method for this locator. So, for each verification method, you would 
need additional verification information that needs to be conveyed in 
the message. In the case of HBA/CGA, there are two options defined, 
namely, CGA Parameter Data Structure Option Format to carry the 
parameter data structure and the CGA Signature Option Format for 
carrying signature information (in the case of CGA)
If we want to support a different security method, what we need to do 
is:-
Define a value of the Verification Method field, so that we can include 
the new verification method in the message (that is easy)
Define new options to carry additional information required by the 
security method if required.
For the case of IPSec for instance, this wouldn't be necesary, i guess. 
If the packet passes the AH /ESP verification and the proper 
certificate or manually configured pre shared is in placed, then the 
locator is validated.
Similar approach could be used with TLS i guess.

From the protocol perspective, adding this mechanisms is trivial. I guess that the compexity is likely to be in the interaction between the processes in the host itself, but i would expect this to work
regards, marcelo


Then, if someone were to take it upon themselves to specify shim6 with TLS security or shim6 with IPsec security, that would look like this:
[tcp][tls([shim signalling])]

[esp([udp][shim6 signalling])]

[ah][udp][shim6 signalling]

Additionally, the TLS/IKE people can define extensions to their protocols to signal the capability to do shim6 and if both sides support it and the necessary prerequisites are met (certificates at both ends, for instance), they can trigger a shim signalling exchange protected by TLS or IPsec so we wouldn't need to implement complex capability negotiations in shim6, and if desired, the shim6 signalling can be encrypted for additional security.