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Re: draft GROW charter
Randy,
Some questions:
- Remembering the story with CCAMP, is Vijay going to
realistically have time for this?
- Goals:
> (viii). To determine operational security issues (joint
> with IDR and RPSEC)
How do you see this split/coordination with IDR and RPSEC
working?
My thought would be to ask GROW to deal with operational
practices required to raise the security level, i.e., things
that neither IDR nor RPSEC would take on.
- Surprised to see BTSH here. The draft changes the way
BGP speakers send and validate incoming TCP segments.
Seems that it should go to IDR.
- Milestones don't cover all goals.
Regards
--
Alex
Tuesday, April 1, 2003, 9:53:05 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
> this week's agenda?
> randy
> ---
> Global Routing Operations Working Group BOF (grow)
> Chair(s):
> David Meyer <dmm@sprint.net>
> Vijay Gill <vijay@umbc.edu>
> Operations and Management Area Director(s):
> Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
> Bert Wijnen <bwijnen@lucent.com>
> Mailing List: grow@lists.uoregon.edu
> To subscribe, send mail to
> majordomo@lists.uoregon.edu with the line
> "subscribe grow" in the body (no quotes).
> The Mhonarc archive can be found at:
> http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/grow/
> username: grow
> password: light
> Description of Working Group:
> -----------------------------
> The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is fundamental to the
> operation of the Internet. In recent years, occurrences
> of BGP related operational issues have increased, and
> while overall understanding of the default-free routing
> system has improved, there is still a long and growing
> list of concerns. Among these are routing table growth
> rates, interaction of interior and exterior routing
> protocols, dynamic properties of the routing system, and
> the effects of routing policy on both the size and
> dynamic nature of the routing table. In addition, new and
> innovative uses of BGP, such as the use of BGP as a
> signaling protocol for some types of Virtual Private
> Networks, have created new and unexpected operational
> issues.
> The purpose of the GROW is continue and expand on
> the original charter of the PTOMAINE WG. In particular,
> the purpose of the GROW is to consider and measure the
> problem of routing table growth, the effects of the
> interactions between interior and exterior routing
> protocols, and the effect of address allocation policies
> and practices on the global routing system. Finally,
> where appropriate, the GROW documents the operational
> aspects of measurement, policy, security, and VPN
> infrastructures.
> GROW will also advise the IDR WG with respect whether it
> is addressing the relevant operational needs, and where
> appropriate, suggest course corrections. Finally,
> operational requirements developed in the GROW can
> also be used by any new working group charged with
> standardizing a next generation inter-domain routing
> protocol.
> GOALS:
> -----
> (i). To provide a clear definition of the problems
> facing Internet Routing Scaling today. This
> includes routing table size and route processing
> load (former PTOMAINE goal).
> (ii). To collate measurements of routing table scaling
> data and publish a reference list (former
> PTOMAINE goal).
> (iii). To discuss and document methods of
> filtering/aggregating prefix information and to
> discuss and document what support from protocols
> or vendor knobs that might be helpful in doing
> this. In addition, to suggest policy guidelines
> to RIRs, LIRs and/or ISPs for allocations and
> aggregations,etc. that may be useful (former
> PTOMAINE goal).
> (iv). To determine the long and short term effects of
> filtering/aggregating prefixes to reduce router
> resource consumption.
> (v). To develop methods of controlling policy
> information propagation in order to limit the
> need for propagation of prefix sub-aggregates.
> (vi). To determine the effects of using BGP as a
> signaling mechanism on the scalability of BGP
> (e.g.,. draft-ietf-ppvpn-rfc2547bis-03.txt)
> (vii). To determine the effects of interaction of new
> IGP techniques (e.g., ISIS-TE) on the stability
> of BGP and in particular, what techniques are
> required to isolate the global infrastructure
> from the any of the dynamic properties of such TE
> systems.
> (viii). To determine operational security issues (joint
> with IDR and RPSEC)
> Some Relevant References:
> -------------------------
> http://www.routeviews.org
> http://bgp.potaroo.net
> http://www.cidr-report.org
> http://www.pch.net/routing/BGP_table_size.html
> http://moat.nlanr.net/AS
> http://www.apnic.net/stats/bgp
> http://www.merit.edu/ipma
> http://www.caida.org/projects/routing/atoms
> Summary of Goals and Milestones:
> -------------------------------
> April 03 Submit BGP TTL Hack Internet Draft
> June 03 Submit Problem Statement Internet Draft
> June 03 Submit References Internet Draft
> July 03 Submit Effects of BGP Signaling Techniques Internet Draft
> Existing Internet Drafts:
> ------------------------
> - NOPEER community for BGP route scope control (at Randy's request, unless forwarded by IESG)
> - Controlling the redistribution of BGP routes (at Randy's request, unless forwarded by IESG)
> - The BGP TTL Hack (draft-gill-btsh-01.txt)
> - draft-turk-bgp-dos-04.txt (potential)
> - draft-hardie-bounded-longest-match-04.txt (potential)
> Request For Comments
> --------------------
> NONE