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Evaluation: draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update - Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks



Last Call to expire on: 2003-08-06

        Please return the full line with your position.

                      Yes  No-Objection  Discuss  Abstain
Harald Alvestrand    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Steve Bellovin       [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Randy Bush           [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Bill Fenner          [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Ned Freed            [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Ted Hardie           [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Russ Housley         [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Allison Mankin       [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Thomas Narten        [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Jon Peterson         [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Margaret Wasserman   [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Bert Wijnen          [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
Alex Zinin           [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]

2/3 (9) Yes or No-Objection opinions needed to pass.

DISCUSSES AND COMMENTS:
======================



^L 
---- following is a DRAFT of message to be sent AFTER approval ---
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce:;
Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>,
    RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Subject: Protocol Action: 'Ingress Filtering for Multihomed 
         Networks' to BCP 

The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft 'Ingress Filtering for Multihomed 
Networks' <draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update-00.txt> as a BCP. This 
document has been reviewed in the IETF but is not the product of an IETF 
Working Group. 
The IESG contact person is Randy Bush.


Technical Summary
 
      RFC 2827 recommends that ISPs police their customers' traffic by
      dropping traffic entering their networks that is coming from a
      source address not legitimately in use by the customer network.
      In the predecessor document, RFC 2267 [1], it was recommended
      that operators filter out traffic whose sources address is a
      so-called "Martian Address" - an address that is reserved,
      including any address within 0.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8,
      172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 224.0.0.0/4, or 240.0.0.0/4.

      This document discusses known technical issues and problems when
      implementing RFC 2827 using
          o Ingress Access Lists,
          o Strict Reverse Path Forwarding,,
          o Loose Reverse Path Forwarding, and
          o Loose Reverse Path Forwarding ignoring default routes
      and discusses trade-offs and work-arounds available to the
      prudent operator.
 
Working Group Summary
 
  As this document is not the product of a working group, there was
  no working group last call. But it was reviewed in various WGs,
  namely multi6 and v6ops.
 
Protocol Quality
 
  This document was reviewd for the IESG by Randy Bush and the
  Operations Directorate.