RE: GSE IDs [Re: IETF multihoming powder: just add IPv6 and stir]

["Bound, Jim" <Jim.Bound@hp.com>]

CGA's have to many IPR issues lets not go there here for this work
please.
/jim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: marcelo bagnulo [mailto:marcelo@it.uc3m.es] 
> Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 8:30 AM
> To: Iljitsch van Beijnum
> Cc: multi6@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: Re: GSE IDs [Re: IETF multihoming powder: just add 
> IPv6 and stir]
> 
> 
> On Thu, 2003-05-08 at 13:30, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
> > On donderdag, mei 8, 2003, at 13:10 Europe/Amsterdam, 
> marcelo bagnulo
> > wrote:
> > 
> > > I guess that what Brian means is that this (what you are 
> describing) 
> > > is not GSE anymore, since it is not stateless (which is a 
> > > fundamental feature of GSE, as i see it)
> > 
> > No disagreement there.
> > 
> > > what you are describing sounds more like MHAP...
> > 
> > Originally, I wanted to write something that encompasses 
> both MHAP and
> > GSE. But:
> > 
> >    "The original GSE and 8+8 drafts split the IPv6 address 
> in two 64-bit
> >     parts. The lower part is used within the site or 
> subnet. Routers add
> >     the higher 64 bits as packets leave the site. Since 
> hosts don't know
> >     the higher 64 bits their correspondent will see, they 
> must disregard
> >     these bits, which has the relatively minor consequence 
> that the TCP
> >     and UDP pseudo header used in checksum calculations 
> must be changed.
> >     A more severe consequence is that the lower 64 bits must now be
> >     globally unique. This in turn makes it very easy to 
> perform spoofing
> >     attacks, as an attacker can simply present arbitrary lower bits,
> >     thereby assuming any desired identity, while setting 
> the higher bits
> >     such that the packets are routed back to the attacker 
> and not to the
> >     host identified by the lower 64 bits. This 
> vulnerability, breaking
> >     autoconfiguration and, to a lesser degree, the transport layer
> >     checksums, make adopting GSE or 8+8 unfeasible and undesirable."
> > 
> > Is there anyone who disagrees and feels stateless GSE is 
> still viable?
> > 
> 
> I think that the statless condition of GSE is really valuable 
> and perhaps we can come up with a solution that can preserve it. 
> 
> As you mention, security issues need to be solved somehow in 
> order to enable this solution.
> 
> A possibility would be to use crypto identifiers such as in 
> HIP but included in the 64 lower bits of the address (CGAs)
> 
> I guess that this could provide the security needed and it 
> would also preserve middle boxes stateless as in GSE.
> 
> 
> Regards, marcelo
>  
> 
> > The letter combination "GSE" will not appear in the title. The
> > preliminary title is "Multihoming in IPv6 by Rewriting Addresses".
> -- 
> marcelo bagnulo <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> uc3m
> 
> 
>