Re: AW: Privacy (Was: Re: NAI decoration: User Identity issues)

[Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>]

Lothar Reith wrote:

> please note that there appears to be a serious misunderstanding of my 
> statements.
>
> In no way did I propose anything that would compromise privacy - in the 
> opposite I am proposing that the attribute 
> "privacy-protected-identity"/"billable identity"/"user-alias" may be 
> considered *essential* to enable privacy by means of using an anonymous 
> NAI for routing the authentication request and a billable-identity only 
> resolvable by the home network  for accounting.

(snip)

> I never stated what you linked with my name:
>
> "Get the user's "trackable" identity for the access
>     network so that fraudulent users can be tracked down and
>     acted upon without involving home operator (possibly in
>     another timezone and government etc)."
>
> The opposite is true:   Provide a 
> "billable-identity"/"privacy-protected-identity"  which on one hand does 
> not allow any tracking by any intermediary or access-network under 
> normal circumstances, but on the other hand allows billing (normal 
> circumstances) and - in case of abuse, i.e. in rare circumstances  - 
> tracking down the abusive user.
>
> I suggested the use of the billing-identity attribute for "tracking" in 
> response to the requirement stated by Klaas Wierenga:
>
> "Some universities want to know the real identity of a user in case of 
> abuse" which he made in the context of the following NAI: 
> "anonymous@university-a.nl"  which implies that the NAI can not be used 
> for this purpose.
>
> The point is, that I do not beleive that these universities require the 
> real identity "in real time" - rather I assume it would be perfectly 
> sufficient to be able to track down the real identity of an abusive 
> anonymous user after the fact of abuse. In this case, the university 
> would have to request the resolution of the anonymous user-name from the 
> home network providing evidence that the request is legitimate.

Ok. Sorry for mixing up who said what. What you say above about
non-real-time does make sense to me.

And I didn't mean to imply that Klaas' requirement is bad either.
I'm just trying to collect possible requirements, and the tracking
requirement is reasonable enough to be considered -- though it may well
be that the privacy requirements conflict with it or that there's
no need for a real-time real-identity tracking. More discussion
is needed on that.

--Jari

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