[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: shim proxy (was Re: failure detection)



On Mon, 22 Aug 2005, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:

the problem is that the is no way to prove the binding between the identifier and their locator sets... i.e. any prefix could be used with any identifier and it would be ok, so any rewriting would be ok, hence the potential attacks...

If, as a subset of all ULIDs, we allow a set of ULIDs to be composed of a network identifier (ie the first 64 bits) and a host identifier (last / least significant 64 bits), ie that the ULID essentially be a valid IPv6 address (which the shim6 drafts anticipate being possible), then the 'proxy' can have a static mapping which need only map the /network/ portion of the ULID to the network portion of a locator. Ie leaving the host portion unchanged.


The security implications are no different from normal static forwarding, as far as I can tell.

Perhaps you could try to evaluate how would such solution cope with the threats described in the threat analysis...

I don't see the threat.

as i said, i consider this proxy capability to be really interesting, but i am afraid you are underestimating the security issues here.

Possible :).

regards, marcelo

regards, -- Paul Jakma paul@clubi.ie paul@jakma.org Key ID: 64A2FF6A Fortune: Don't put off for tomorrow what you can do today because if you enjoy it today, you can do it again tomorrow.