On Mon, 22 Aug 2005, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
the problem is that the is no way to prove the binding between the
identifier and their locator sets... i.e. any prefix could be used
with any identifier and it would be ok, so any rewriting would be ok,
hence the potential attacks...
If, as a subset of all ULIDs, we allow a set of ULIDs to be composed
of a network identifier (ie the first 64 bits) and a host identifier
(last / least significant 64 bits), ie that the ULID essentially be a
valid IPv6 address (which the shim6 drafts anticipate being possible),
then the 'proxy' can have a static mapping which need only map the
/network/ portion of the ULID to the network portion of a locator. Ie
leaving the host portion unchanged.
The security implications are no different from normal static
forwarding, as far as I can tell.