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draft of rtg-dir feedback on routing protocol overloading
- To: iesg@ietf.org
- Subject: draft of rtg-dir feedback on routing protocol overloading
- From: Alex Zinin <zinin@psg.com>
- Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 00:02:56 -0700
- Cc: iab@ietf.org
- In-reply-to: <14548706736.20030709235716@psg.com>
- References: <14548706736.20030709235716@psg.com>
below is the first draft summary of the rtg-dir discussion.
some changes are likely, but good enough for us to talk.
--
Alex
http://www.psg.com/~zinin/
On the question of appropriate and inappropriate use of routing
protocols in general, and BGP in particular.
1. Routing protocols are generally designed with specific assumptions
in mind about the amount of information that needs to be
distributed, the frequency of its changes, and it's nature. These
assumptions influence such characteristics of the routing
protocols as required bandwidth, CPU utilization, convergence
times, as well as the overall protocol scalability.
2. Hardware and software of the Internet routers have been carefully
fine-tuned over the years to ensure adequate routing stability and
convergence characteristics of the SP networks and the Internet as
a whole. Particular care has been taken to minimize unnecessary
routing protocol packet drops, high CPU utilization, excessive
memory consumption, distributed instabilities (such as flooding
storms.)
3. Routing protocols in general SHOULD NOT be treated as a general
purpose reliable multicast transport system because of the
following aspects:
a) when used for an arbitrary application, the fundamental
assumptions (see bullet 1 above) may not hold true any more,
and the scalability of the protocol may be affected
b) if implemented and deployed in a tightly-coupled fashion
with the Internet routing system (sharing the same transport
and protocol sessions, internal router infrastructure, databases,
etc.), additional applications of the routing protocols may start
competing for resources (see bullet 2 above) and thus affect
behavior and scalability of the Internet routing system.
While the right design choices may prevent undesired effects, it
is hard to foresee all possible interactions, and so the
probability of a failure is increased.
4. Generally, the decision on whether a particular type of
information belongs in a routing protocol or not should be made on
a case-by-case basis. However, it is considered appropriate to
distribute the following types of it in the routing protocols:
a) information required to calculate the routing tables
b) route tagging, administrative, and policy-related information
c) security-related information
d) information closely related to routing, especially when
synchronization with routing information is needed
Note that even for the cases above, a careful analysis must be
performed to show that the volume and frequency of the information
will stay within reasonable bounds.
5. For non-routing-related applications, the onus probandi lies with
the proposers to show:
a) why the use of a routing protocol is appropriate (and by
inference, why some other mechanism isn't), and
b) why this use cannot break the routing protocol
6. If the framework used in a specific routing protocol is agreed to be
a good fit for a non-routing application, and synchronization with
the routing information is not an issue, it is recommended that
potential interference with the Internet routing system is avoided
by using a separate instance of the protocol (or, obviously, by
instantiating a new protocol with a similar framework.)
On whether the specific approaches described in the documents above
represent an appropriate use of BGP:
7. From the purely encoding and dynamics perspective (not taking
into considerations potential interactions with the Internet
routing system), and from the perspective of the BGP's general
framework, rather than it's being an IP routing protocol, the
following comments apply:
a) NLRI overloading is considered slightly (though only
slightly) problematic.
Specifically, appearance of the TLVs in the NLRI field does
not match the original of separation of keying information
(prefixes) and their parameters in BGP. However, it is
understood that, in a way, TLVs formalize representation of
key-bound information.
A cleaner approach would be to provide a mechanism to
encode prefix-specific parameters outside the NLRI field.
b) Extended communities normally used for policy purposes
are used to distribute membership information. Thus, misconfiguration
of policy on extended communities may potentially be hazardous to
the correct operation of a VPN
c) RSN TLV. It is not clear how often the contents of this
TLV found in the NLRI field would change, and hence wether
it would cause excessive updates or not.
d) The documents should clearly specify what information is
present in the MP-NEXTHOP field and how it is used
8. However, the bigger concern is how introduction of this
information in BGP would affect the Internet routing system.
Steps described in bullet 5 above should be followed, and
the VPN and BGP communities should consider separating the
Internet routing BGP system from other, non-routing-related
applications of the BGP framework (the VPN case included.)