Re: Discuss comments on draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes

[Margaret Wasserman <mrw@windriver.com>]

I would feel more comfortable with this specification if the
security consideration sections said that the client MUST
NOT display any logo information, unless the certificate has
been validated with the CA.

In that case, I agree that the CA should be trusted to
associate the right logo information (for some definition)
with the certificate.

But, displaying logos for unvalidated certificates along
with a warning message only seems like a good way to distract
users from taking the warning seriously.

Margaret


At 11:59 PM 9/17/2003 -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
> Margaret:
>
> The certificate is signed by the Certification Authority.  The CA is 
> responsible for the accuracy of all of the information in the certificate.
>
> I belive that the most valuable use of this draft has to do with selection 
> of a certificate from a whole pile.  Assume that you have certificates 
> from Starbucks and Boingo for use with EAP-TLS to access wireless 
> networks.  When attempting to access a wireless network, the user will 
> know which credential is most likely to work, so the Starbucks logo and 
> the Boingo logo will do much more to help the use make the right choice 
> than viewing subject and issuer names in the certificates.
>
> Russ
>
> At 11:49 PM 9/17/2003 -0400, Margaret Wasserman wrote:
>
>
> > I have entered the attached DISCUSS comments on
> > draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes.
> >
> > Margaret
> >
> >
> > Although I don't object, in principle, to the idea of associating logos
> > or sounds with certificates, I am having trouble understanding the value
> > of doing so.  Also, I found much of the text in this document to be
> > either confusing or disturbing.
> >
> > The discussion of human psychology and branding in the introduction
> > seems misplaced in a protocol specification.
> >
> > Also, there is a strange tension in this document between:
> >
> > 1) The  purpose of including logo information in a certificate
> >    is that users will decide how much to trust a given certificate
> >    based on its "brand".
> > 2) There is no way to authenticate that the logo information
> >    associated with a certificate is valid in any way.
> >
> > The security considerations section says:
> >
> > "It is thus imperative that the representation of any
> > certificate that fails to validate is not enhanced in any way by
> > using the logotype graphic unless an appropriate warning is given to
> > the end user."
> >
> > But, other sections of the document have already acknowledged the
> > fact that the user will pay more attention to whether or not he
> > trusts the apparent "brand" of the certificate than to an obscure
> > warning message...