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Re: Discuss comments on draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes

Margaret:

RFC 3280 is silent on the presentation of information from certificates that fail to validate. This is partly because there are so many different reasons that a certificate might fail to validate, and it is partly because it is not a "bits on the wire" issue.

I am opposed to the words that Steve proposed because certificate information is "used" to generate error messages. Let's face it, most users do not know what a certificate is. Anything that helps them understand that the stuff that they got to enable the use of the Starbucks wireless network is not working any more, probably because the certificate expired, is helpful.

Russ


If you want an additional warning, I'm not going to object.  But it
should be worded something like this:

        As with all other fields in a certificate, logo information
        MUST NOT be used until the validity of the certificate has been
        successfully checked.

This statement would work for me.

Currently, the document says:

"It is thus imperative that the representation of any certificate
that fails to validate is not enhanced in any way by using the
logotype graphic unless an appropriate warning is given to the
end user."

...which I found pretty weak.

Are there any cases when a certificate that fails to validate
should be represented to the user without a warning?  This
paragraph implies that it is okay to do so, as long as the
logo information isn't displayed.

I also think that displaying a trusted logo (like the MS logo)
along with the warning message would actually make it _more_
likely that a user would ignore the warning and click "OK".

I'm not going to lose sleep over this, though, if our security
folks really think that what's in the current draft is adequate.

Margaret